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Abstract
The burden sharing of pollution abatement costs raises the issue of how to share the costs
between entities (country, region or industry) and how the pollution permits should be
distributed between the parties involved. This paper explores this issue in the framework
of a dynamic endogenous growth 2 sectors - 2 regions - 2 inputs Heckscher-Ohlin model
of a small open multi-regional economy with an international tradable permits market.
Given an “emission-based grand-fathering” sharing rule, capital accumulation is more
negatively affected by the environmental policy in the energy intensive sector. We show
that such a property does not necessarily hold with a “production-based grand-fathering”
sharing rule. We also show that the impact on capital is likely to translate into the sectoral
added value level after some time, specially if the economy is submitted to an increasingly
constraining environmental policy driving up the ratio price of permits to price of energy.
Finally, we show that the impact of environmental policy at the regional level depends
crucially on the specialization of the region along the baseline.
Keywords: Pollution permits, Grand-fathering, Sectoral spillovers, Multi-regional econ-
omy, Endogenous growth
Journal of Economic Literature: D58, H21,E22,O40.
1 Introduction
The burden sharing of pollution abatement costs, e.g. in the Kyoto Protocol context,
raises the issue of how to share the costs between entities (country, region or industry)
and how the pollution permits should be distributed between the parties involved in the
Protocol. In Belgium, the debate opposes in particular the Flemish and Walloon regions.
W.r.t. the other regions, Wallonia is characterized by an industry which is more energy
consuming. From the point of view of Flanders, the bulk of the effort should thus be
made in Wallonia, where the abatement measures are assumed to be less expensive. On
the contrary, this solution is considered to be too unfavourable by Wallonia.
Now it is important to emphasize that the fact that a country’s activities are more
energy consuming does not necessarily result from their inefficiency. It can also result
from the specialization of this country in the production of relatively energy intensive
goods, a specialization conditioned itself by its comparative advantages and which should
benefit through international trade to all countries involved in it.
In the context of the Belgian burden sharing debate, Germain et al. (2006) develop
a model of a 2 sectors - 2 regions small open economy, where each sector produces one
good by using fossil energy and another sector specific factor1. Sector 1 is more energy
intensive and thus more polluting than sector 2. One region is more specialized in the
energy intensive sector. Hence, its energy consumption per unit of added value is higher.
Given an environmental policy that increases the price of energy (through an energy tax
or through the tradable permits price), the authors show as a first result that the energy
intensive sector is more burdened than the other sector, so that the region specialized in
the energy intensive sector is more burdened than the other region.
Now this intuitive result does not necessarily extend when one takes into account the
tax revenues or the tradable permits endowments associated to the control of pollution.
The impacts of an emission reduction policy can indeed be modulated by bringing into
play such transfers assigned to the regions. In this respect the above authors compute
the permits endowments to the regions such that the environmental policy has both the
property to be efficient (i.e. abatement marginal costs are equalized between sectors and
regions) and fair (i.e. the relative losses of welfare are identical between regions). The
endowment is of course relatively more generous for the region specialized in the energy
intensive sector. And the difference between regional permits endowments is higher, (i)
the higher the national objective in terms of emission reduction, and (ii) the more the
regions are unevenly affected by the climate policy.
The analysis of Germain et al. (2006) presents the drawback to be static. However
a region or a country’s factor endowments and thus its specialization are likely to evolve
through time. Consequently the impacts on this region or country of a long term environ-
mental policy (like climate policies) are also likely to evolve through time. On the other
hand, if the impacts of an environmental policy on a country’s welfare depend on its spe-
cialization, the dependence is likely to go the other way around. Indeed it seems probable
that an emission reduction policy that translates in an increase of the total cost of energy
will induce a change in a country’s specialization towards less energy intensive products,
and this seems the more likely to happen the more this country is initially specialized in
energy intensive goods.
In this paper, we shall consider a dynamic model allowing for specialization rever-
1These specific factors can be considered as aggregates of all non-fossil energy factors (such as capital,
labour, infrastructure, non fossil energies,...) with different composition .
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sal. One way to get such a property is to incorporate time-dependent spillovers across
economic sectors and regions. This might even be the easiest way to generate reversals
in specialization. There is an extensive literature about spillovers both at a regional or
international level. In particular, the empirical assessment of such spillovers have been
at the heart of a quite abundant empirical literature. An important and early contribu-
tion to the topic is due to Coe and Helpman (1995) who assessed the economic growth
impact of R&D expenditures in OECD countries. They found that such expenditures are
beneficial not only for the performing countries but also for the trade partners. Smolny
(1999) provided an empirical evaluation of international sectoral spillovers for German
and US industries using a broad panel of industry sector data for both countries over
the period 1960-1990. In particular, Smolny analyzed productivity convergence, trying
to disentangling the precise mechanisms behind. He found that most of the convergence
comes from total factor productivity convergence, and more importantly, that endogenous
growth models relying on knowledge spillovers are confirmed by the estimates. Lejour and
Nahuis (2005) studied in deep the sectoral nature of R&D spillovers and its impact on
economic growth. They stressed that the effects of sectoral spillovers do depend on the
specialization patterns.
There are also plenty of empirical contributions addressing the issue of spillovers’ extent at
a regional level. Among them, Van Stel and Nieuwenhuijsen (2004) is a good illustration
of this stream of literature. While they did not find any compelling evidence on the
growth effect of specialization, in contrast to Lejour and Nahuis (2005), they identified
some clear spillovers in certain sectors (specially in the sector services). As one can see,
the empirical debate on spillovers is currently much more centered on the kind of relevant
spillovers than on the existence of such spillovers, which seems largely admitted. One
of the crucial issues turn out to be whether intra-sectoral or inter-sectoral spillovers are
more important for economic growth. As to this precise point, the evidence is mixed. A
recent study by Malerba, Mancusi and Montobbio (2004) tends however to put forward
intra-sectoral spillovers. Using a unique panel data on R&D expenditures and patent
citations in 135 narrowly defined technological classes (or sectors) in France, Italy, Japan,
United-Kingdom and the US, over the period 1981-1995, they show that the effect of
intra-sectoral spillovers is 70% higher than the effect of national inter-sectoral spillovers.
We shall incorporate intra-sectoral spillovers in our model: the industries in a given sec-
tor of a given region are assumed to benefit from knowledge spillovers from the industries
of the same sector in the other region. As we shall see in Section 2, considering at
the same time inter and intra-sectoral spillovers in our model would induce the same
long-run capital accumulation in ALL sectors and in ALL regions, which sounds an un-
desirable outcome as it implies that the sectoral composition of the economy is irrelevant
in the long-run. Recent studies on two-sector growth models tend rather to emphasize
that investment-specific technological progress (as opposed to the typical Harrod-neutral
technological progress at work in the consumption good sector) is likely to generate a per-
sistent productivity gap between the capital good and consumption good sectors, which
should translate into different patterns of capital accumulation. This divergence is clearly
reflected in the downward trend of the relative price of capital, first pointed out by Gor-
don (1990), and later exploited in a two-sector accounting framework by Greenwood,
Hercowitz and Krusell (1997).
The aim of this paper is to study the impacts of long term environmental policies in
the framework of a dynamic 2 sectors - 2 regions - 2 inputs (capital and energy) Heckscher-
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Ohlin model of a small open multiregional economy with an international tradable permits
market. The main features of the model are the following. Contrary to Germain et al.’s
static model, factor endowments are no more exogenous (except in the first period). Sector
1 produces capital goods while sector 2 produces consumer goods. Energy is imported and
emissions are proportional to energy use. Sector 1 is more energy intensive than sector
2. The technologies of both sectors are the same in both regions. Because the country
is treated as a small open economy, prices are determined by the rest of the world and
are thus exogenous. One of the two regions is specialized in the production of the energy
intensive good. Growth in endogenous : returns to scale are decreasing at the level of
the firm, but because of the technological spillovers, returns to scale are constant at the
sectoral level.
The model is an endogenous growth model, where the aggregate productivity of a
firm depends on the capital accumulated at the level of the sector and the region to
which it belongs. The spillovers are intra-sectoral as already mentioned: For a given
sector, there are technological spillovers from one region to the other. Thanks to these
spillovers, returns to scale at the sectoral level are constant. This is the simplest way
to model spillovers. It is based on the Arrowian learning-by-investing mechanism, re-
suscitated by Romer (1986). Introducing R&D expenditures would have complicated
unnecessarily the model given our main objectives. Rather we consider the shortcut of
learning-by-investing to get a tractable yet far from trivial inter-sectoral inter-regional
growth model. Boucekkine, del Rio and Licandro (2003) have already studied two-sector
models with learning-by-investing in each sector. However, they consider a non-regional
closed-economy, which has its advantages and its disadvantages from the analytical point
of view. Given the environmental motivation of the paper, it seems out of question that
the open economy structure adopted here is more adapted.
Within our framework, the respective specializations of the two regions converge
through time, but not necessarily in a monotonous way. Following Bo¨hringer and Lange
(2005), the permits endowment of a firm is a function of its past emissions, and according
to the scenario, this feature is internalized by the firm or not. The impact of the environ-
mental policy on the sectors with respect to the baseline (no policy) scenario is compared
successively at the level of (i) the sectors’ growth rate, (ii) the sectors’ capital stock, (iii)
the sectors’ added value, (iv) the sectors’ revenue after transfers (i.e. taking account of
the permits endowments), (v) the regions’ added value, and (vi) the regions’ revenue after
transfers.
We now summarize the principal results. At the level of the growth rate and of the
capital stock,
(i) a first result is that a given sector is identically affected in both regions. This follows
from the fact that regions face the same exogenous prices and share the same technologies.
(ii) Given an ”emission-based grand-fathering” sharing rule, a second result is that the
energy intensive sector is more (negatively) affected by the environmental policy than the
other sector.
To evaluate how results depends on the chosen endowment rule, we consider a dynamic
production-based grandfathering rule, where a firm’s current permits endowments depends
on its previous period production. And we indeed show that result (ii) above does not
necessarily hold with such a ”production-based grand-fathering” sharing rule.
The impact of the environmental policy at the sectoral added value level results from
(i) its impact at the capital level identified in the previous paragraph and (ii) a ”price
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effect” linked to the increase of the total cost of energy. This second effect is favorable to
the energy intensive sector because the elasticity of its energy consumption to the total
cost of energy is higher. Thus the comparison of the impacts on the sectoral added value
is not trivial. Nevertheless, in the case of an ”emission-based grand-fathering” sharing
rule, one verifies that the impact at the level of capital is likely to prevail after some time.
This will in particular happen in the case of an economy submitted to a more and more
constraining environmental policy driving up the ratio price of permits/price of energy.
The total sectoral revenue is defined as the sectoral added value plus the net transfer
received by the sector. This net transfer is equal to the endowment of permits received less
the permits used, multiplied by the price of permits. Because the baseline is characterized
by sectoral growth rates that converge to the same limit, and under the assumption that
no sector is advantaged w.r.t. the other (i.e. the relation between permits endowment and
energy consumption is the same for the two sectors), then the energy intensive sector is
at least after some time more affected by the environmental policy than the other sector.
It also appears that the fact that a firm internalize or not the relation between its permits
endowment and its past emissions does not affect this last result.
The last stage of the analysis is to evaluate the impact of the environmental policy
at the regional level. This is done both at the level of the regional added value and at
the level of the total regional revenue (i.e. taking account of the regional endowments
of permits). The impact depends crucially on the specialization of the region along the
baseline. The two regions converge to the same specialization (measured by the ratio of
the capital stocks of their respective sectors), but not necessarily in a monotonous way.
Conditions are established under which the spread of specialization, that depends on the
initial capital endowments and on the technological spillovers, might be reversed. If the
energy intensive sector is more affected than the other sector, then the region specialized in
the energy intensive sector suffers more from the environmental policy. One also observes
that translated in the framework of the Belgian debate, our result suggests that there will
be no inversion of specialization (at least after some time), so that Wallonia is likely to
be more affected than Flanders by environmental policies as modeled in this paper, not
only in the short run (as in Germain et al., 2006) but also in the long run.
The structure of the paper is the following. Section 2 characterizes (i) the dynamic 2
sectors - 2 regions - 2 inputs (capital and energy) Heckscher-Ohlin model of a small open
economy, (ii) the way interregional technological spillovers at the sector level are modeled
and (iii) the specialization of the regions. Section 3 is devoted to the impacts of an
environmental policy in the framework of an international permits market. One starts by
characterizing the main assumptions underlying the baseline (no policy) scenario. Then
the impacts of the environmental policy are evaluated as stated above, starting at the
level of the sectors’ growth rate and finishing at the level of the regions’ total revenue.
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2 The model
We model a 2 regions - 2 sectors - 2 inputs small open multiregional economy where :
- the 2 regions are indexed by i (i = v, w),
- the 2 sectors (or 2 goods) are indexed by j (j = a, b),
- the 2 inputs are capital (k) and fossil energy (e).
Capital is understood in a broad sense, i.e. as a bundle of inputs like physical and
human capital, infrastructures, non-fossil energy,... Given that we consider a small open
economy, agents are price-takers and prices are determined by the Rest of the World
and thus exogenous. Sector a produces capital goods, sector b produces consumption
goods. Energy is imported. Technology depends only on the sector and is the same
for the two regions. National and foreign products of a certain type are supposed to
be perfect substitutes. Emissions are linked to energy consumption, and for the sake of
simplicity, e denotes simultaneously energy and emissions. We assume that there exists
an international tradable permits market where polluting firms can buy of sell permits at
a given exogenous price.
2.1 Behavior of the firms
The technology of sector j (j = a, b) of region i (i = v, w) at date t (t ≥ 1) is described
by the following Cobb-Douglas production function with decreasing returns to scale
yijt = Aijtk
αj
ijte
βj
ijt (1)
where y, k and e are production, capital and energy respectively and A is a coefficient
that measures technological progress. The technological parameters αj and βj verify
0 < αj, βj < αj + βj < 1.
The representative firm of sector j of region i is assumed to choose the flow of its energy
consumption and investment in order to maximise the sum of its discounted profits :
Πij = max{eijt,iijt}t≥1
∑
t≥1
piijt
[1 + r]t
(2)
under the constraints that
kijt = kij,t−1[1− δj] + iijt, t ≥ 1 (3)
eijt = e˜ijt + λjteij,t−1 + µjtyij,t−1, t ≥ 1 (4)
where by definition
piijt = pjtyijt − qteijt − patiijt + τt [eijt − eijt] (5)
and where eij0, kij0 and yij0 are given. r is the (exogenous) positive discount rate. (3)
is the familiar capital accumulation equation, where δ measures the depreciation rate of
capital and (5) defines piijt as the current profit of sector j of region i at date t, where
pj, q and τ are the prices of good j (j = a, b), energy and tradable permits respectively.
. Following Bo¨ringer and Lange (2005), (4) defines the permits endowment received by
sector j of region i at date t (eijt) as a linear function of its production and emissions
of the previous period, where e˜ijt, λjt and µjt are given exogenous (eventually variable)
positive parameters.
After substitution of (5), (3) and (4) in (2), the problem rewrites
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max
{eijt,iijt}t≥1
∑
t≥1
1
[1 + r]t
[pjtyijt − [qt + τt] eijt
−pat [kijt − kij,t−1[1− δj]] + τt [e˜ijt + λjteij,t−1 + µjtyij,t−1]]
=
1
[1 + r]
[pa1kij0[1− δj] + τ1 [λj1eij0 + µj1yij0]]
+ max
{eijt,iijt}t≥1
∑
t≥1
1
[1 + r]t
[[
pjt + τt+1
µj,t+1
1 + r
]
yijt −
[
qt + τt − τt+1λj,t+1
1 + r
]
eijt
−
[
pat − pa,t+11− δj
1 + r
]
kijt + τte˜ijt
]
= Cte + max
{eijt,iijt}t≥1
∑
t≥1
1
[1 + r]t
[p̂jtyijt − q˜teijt − p˜jtkijt + τte˜ijt] (6)
where we define
p̂jt = pjt + τt+1
µj,t+1
1 + r
(7)
as the adjusted price of sector j at date t;
p˜jt =
[
pat − pa,t+11− δj
1 + r
]
(8)
as the user cost of capital of sector j at date t and
q˜jt = qt + τt − τt+1λj,t+1
1 + r
(9)
as the user cost of energy of sector j at date t.
First order conditions lead to
∂Πij
∂kijt
= αj p̂jtAijtk
αj−1
ij1 e
βj
ij1 − p˜at = 0
∂Πij
∂eijt
= βj p̂jtAijtk
αj
ijte
βj−1
ijt − q˜jt = 0
which leads to the following solutions
kijt =
[
pjtAijt
[
αj
p˜jt
]1−βj [ βj
q˜jt
]βj] 11−αj−βj
(10)
eijt =
[
pjtAijt
[
αj
p˜jt
]αj [ βj
q˜jt
]1−αj] 11−αj−βj
(11)
yijt =
[
p
αj+βj
jt Aijt
[
αj
p˜jt
]αj [ βj
q˜jt
]βj] 11−αj−βj
(12)
The previous formulas lead to
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eijt =
βj p̂jtyijt
q˜jt
(13)
yijt =
p˜jkijt
αj p̂jt
(14)
2.2 Endogenous growth and technical spillovers
One assumes that
Aijt = ρt [θjtkij,t−1 + [1− θjt]Kj,t−1]γj (15)
where by definition, Kjt = kwjt+ kvjt is the capital of sector j at the country level. γj
is such that αj+βj+ γj = 1, i.e. global returns to scale are constant. ρt and θjt (t ≥ 1) are
exogenous positive parameters. With respect to the spillover parameters θjt, we assume
that 0 ≤ θjt < 1 (∀t ≥ 1) and limt→+∞ = θj < 1. (15) shows that the productivity factor
of sector j of region i at time t depends not only of the capital of this sector inherited
from the previous period, but also of the capital of the same sector of the other region.
There is thus a interregional technological spillover at the sector level. The spillover is
intra-sectoral as mentioned repeatedly below. Notice that the larger θjt, the lower the
impact of the learning-by-investing accumulated in region w on technological progress in
region v for sector j. We shall use this observation in some interpretations later on.
Finally, we assume that the price of sector a is the numeraire, i.e. pat = 1 (∀t ≥ 1),
which implies that the cost of capital is constant for both sectors (p˜jt = p˜j =
δj+r
1+r
, j =
a, b).
Given the previous assumptions, and given (10), one obtains
kijt =
[
p̂jt
[
αj
p˜j
]1−βj [ βj
q˜jt
]βj] 11−αj−βj
A
1
1−αj−βj
ijt
= ζjtρt [θjtkij,t−1 + [1− θjt]Kj,t−1]
= ζjtρt
[
kij,t−1 + [1− θjt] keij,t−1
]
(16)
where i˜ designates the other region and where
ζjt =def
[
p̂jt
[
αj
p˜j
]1−βj [ βj
q˜jt
]βj] 11−αj−βj
(17)
For each sector j, we consider the system:
kwjt = ζjtρ [kwj,t−1 + [1− θjt] kvj,t−1] (18)
kvjt = ζjtρt [kvj,t−1 + [1− θjt] kwj,t−1] (19)
t ∈ T , kwj0 and kvj0 given.
Proposition 1 The solutions to the system (18-19) can be expressed as:
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kwjt =
1
2
t∏
m=1
ζjmρjm
{
[kwj0 + kvj0]
t∏
m=1
[2− θjm] + [kwj0 − kvj0]
t∏
m=1
θjm
}
(20)
kvjt =
1
2
t∏
m=1
ζjmρjm
{
[kwj0 + kvj0]
t∏
m=1
[2− θjm] + [kvj0 − kwj0]
t∏
m=1
θjm
}
(21)
Proof. See appendix. ¤
It follows immediately that for a given sector j, if the two regions have the same initial
endowment of capital in that sector (i.e. kwj0 = kvj0), then their respective endowment
of capital remain equal in all periods (kvjt = kwjt =
1
2
[kwj0 + kvj0]
∏t
m=1 ζjmρm [2− θjm]).
Furthermore :
Corollary 1 Whatever the initial conditions and the exogenous patterns, the regional
capital stocks of the same sector converge to the same pattern asymptotically :
lim
t→+∞
kwjt = lim
t→+∞
kvjt =
1
2
[kwj0 + kvj0]
+∞∏
m=1
ζjmρm [2− θjm] , j = a, b
Proof. By Proposition 1, one can write for Region i :
kijt =
1
2
{
t∏
m=1
ζjmρm [2− θjm]
}{
kij0 + keij0 +
[
kij0 − keij0
] t∏
m=1
θjm
2− θjm
}
(22)
where i˜ is the other region. Given that by assumption, the sequence θjt is such that
0 ≤ θjt < 1 and limt→+∞ = θj < 1, we have : θjm2−θjm < 1, ∀m ≥ 1, so that the
sequence ωjt =
∏t
m=1
θjm
2−θjm is strictly decreasing, and since it is bounded, it is converging.
Notice that ωjt is asymptotically geometric with coefficient
θj
2−θj < 1, which implies that
limt→+∞ ωjt = 0. ¤
This strong result follows from the fact that besides different initial sectoral dotation
of capital, the two regions are identical : they face the same international prices and
share the same technologies. In the presence of intra-sectoral spillovers, the divergence
force coming from endogenous growth (namely, constant returns) is neutralized. Indeed,
notice that if the parameters θjt = 1 for every t, then equations (18) and (19) would
imply that the capital stocks of the two regions will diverge over time if the initial stocks
are different. If this sequence of parameters is permanently strictly below 1, then such
a divergence vanishes because intra-sectoral spillovers will neutralize the divergence force
arising from the underlying AK structure.
Given (22), one can express the growth rate of sector j of region i at time t as :
gijt =
kijt
kij,t−1
= ζjtρt [2− θjt]Xijt, i = v, w, j = a, b, t ≥ 1 (23)
where by definition :
Xijt =
kij0 + keij0 +
[
kij0 − keij0
]∏t
m=1
θjm
2−θjm
kij0 + keij0 +
[
kij0 − keij0
]∏t−1
m=1
θjm
2−θjm
(24)
In the long term, gijt tends to ζjtρt
[
2− θj
]
, which as expected does not depend on i.
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2.3 Specialization of the regions
Let us define the specialization index of Region i (i = v, w) at time t by the ratio :
χit =
kiat
kibt
(25)
We also define the spread of specialization index at time t by the ratio of the specialization
indexes of the two regions :
σt =
χwt
χvt
=
kwat
kwbt
kvbt
kvat
The purpose of the present subsection is to study what determines the evolution of the
regions’ specialization through time. Using (22), we have :
χit =
kiat
kibt
=
{∏t
m=1 ζamρm [2− θjm]
}{
kia0 + keia0 + [kia0 − keia0]∏tm=1 θam2−θam}{∏t
m=1 ζbmρm [2− θjm]
}{
kib0 + keib0 + [kib0 − keib0]∏tm=1 θbm2−θbm} , i = v, w
and
σt =
{
kwa0 + kva0 + [kwa0 − kva0]
∏t
m=1
θam
2−θam
}
{
kwb0 + kvb0 + [kwb0 − kvb0]
∏t
m=1
θbm
2−θbm
}
{
kwb0 + kvb0 + [kvb0 − kwb0]
∏t
m=1
θbm
2−θbm
}
{
kwa0 + kva0 + [kva0 − kwa0]
∏t
m=1
θam
2−θam
}
(26)
One observes the remarkable fact that the spread of specialization index depends only
on the initial stocks of capital and on the spillovers parameters that are exogenous. As
a consequence this index will not be affected by the environmental policies that are con-
sidered below. This does not mean that the specialization index of a region (defined by
(25)) does not change under an environmental policy w.r.t. the baseline. It means that
the specialization indexes of the two regions are affected identically such that their spread
remains unchanged.
In the long run, these formulas imply the following properties :
lim
t→+∞
χit =
Ka0
Kb0
[
+∞∏
m=1
ζam
ζbm
]
, i = v, w (27)
and
lim
t→+∞
σt = 1 (28)
This result follows immediately from Corollary 1. (27) shows that in the long run the re-
gional specialization index reflects the initial specialization index at the national level and
the exogenous patterns of prices (through the parameters ζjm (see (17)), which interact
multiplicatively in our model.
Assume that σ0 > 1 (i.e. Region w is more specialized in the production of the capital
good). The preceding result does not imply that σt decreases monotonously from σ0 > 1
to σ∞ = 1. We have indeed the following proposition :
Proposition 2 The spread of specialization index might be reversed in period t w.r.t.
period 0 (i.e. σ0 > 1 and σt < 1), depending on the ratio of the spillover parameters
θbt/θat (t ≥ 1) and on the initial capital endowments.
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Proof. Given (26), it is easy to verify that σt < 1 implies that :
[kwb0 + kvb0] [kwa0 − kva0]
t∏
m=1
θam
2− θam < [kwa0 + kva0] [kwb0 − kvb0]
t∏
m=1
θbm
2− θbm
Two cases emerge :
(a) kwb0 − kvb0 > 0 : then it follows that kwa0 − kva0 > 0 because σ0 > 1 by assumption.
Then σt < 1 iff
[kwb0 + kvb0] [kwa0 − kva0]
[kwa0 + kva0] [kwb0 − kvb0] <
t∏
m=1
θbm
2−θbm
θam
2−θam
(29)
which holds if the sequence {θbt, t ≥ 1} is in ”average” high enough w.r.t. the sequence
{θat, t ≥ 1} 2;
(b) kwb0 − kvb0 < 0 : it follows that σt < 1 iff
[kwb0 + kvb0] [kwa0 − kva0]
[kwa0 + kva0] [kwb0 − kvb0] >
t∏
m=1
θbm
2−θbm
θam
2−θam
(30)
which holds if kwa0− kva0 < 0 and if the sequence {θbt, t ≥ 1} is in ”average” low enough
w.r.t. the sequence {θat, t ≥ 1} 3. ¤
3 Impact of an environmental policy
3.1 Preliminaries
We assume that the baseline tends in the long run to a balanced growth path characterized
by the asymptotic constant growth rate g that applies to both sectors. Formally, this
means that
gBijt =
kBijt
kBij,t−1
= ζBjtρt [2− θjt]Xijt = gXijt (31)
where given (17),
ζBjt =
[
pjt
[
αj
p˜j
]1−βj [βj
qt
]βj] 11−ϕ
(32)
and where Xijt is defined by (24). This is equivalent to assume that at the world level,
the evolution of prices of goods reflects sectoral technical progress, the costs of inputs and
technological spillovers. Because the price of sector a is the nume´raire, this implies that
qt =
[
Ca
[
ρt[2−θat]
g
]1−ϕ]1/βa
and pbt =
q
βb
t
Cb
[
g
ρt[2−θbt]
]1−ϕ
, where Cj =
[
αjepj
]1−βj
β
βj
j (j = a, b)
are constants.
As we aim to compare the impacts of an environmental policy (EP) between sectors
and between regions, we state the two following important assumptions :
2This implies that in the long term (i.e. when the sequences are close to their limit values θj (j = a, b))
the ratio θb/θa is high enough.
3In case (b), if kwa0 − kva0 > 0, then the regions have opposite specializations (i.e. kwa0 > kva0 and
kwb0 < kvb0). Then a remarkable fact is that the previous inequality cannot be satisfied whatever the
spillover parameters (inversion of specialization is impossible).
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- Sector a is more energy intensive than sector b :
βa > βb (33)
- Region w est initially more specialized in the production of good a than Region v :
kwa0
kwb0
>
kva0
kvb0
(34)
In this respect, assumption (34) means that Region w is initially more specialized than
Region v in the production of good a (χw0 > χv0 ⇔ σ0 > 1).
We look at the impact of an environmental policy (EP) characterized by a sequence
of permits prices {τt, t ≥ 1} and by permits endowments defined by (4). Now, as will
soon become clear below, it is impossible to obtain clear-cut results when comparing the
impacts of the EP between sectors or between regions if this policy is characterized by
a general burden sharing rule like (4). In order to derive precise results, we will mainly
focus on dynamic emission-based grand-fathering rules, where a firm’s current permits
endowment depends on its previous period emissions4. We qualify this dependance as the
”endowment” effect and consider two cases whether this effect is internalized or not by
firms when they maximise their profits :
- No internalisation5 : one applies (4) with λjt = µjt = 0 (j = a, b, ∀t ≥ 1) and :
eijt = e˜ijt = ηeij,t−1,
where 0 < η < 1 and eij,t−1 are the emissions characterising the EP until t − 1. e˜ijt is
considered as exogenous by the firms when they solve problem (2), then given (7) and
(9), p̂jt = pjt and q˜jt = qt + τt.
- Internalisation : one applies (4) with e˜ijt = µj = 0 and :
eijt = λjeij,t−1
where 0 < λj < 1 and eij,t−1 are the emissions characterising the EP until t − 1. eijt is
considered as endogenous by the firms when they solve problem (2), then given (7) and
(9), p̂jt = pjt and q˜jt = qt + τt − τt+1 λj1+r .
We will also assume that λj is sufficiently small so that the effect of today’s energy
consumption on tomorrow’s permits endowment is never sufficient to counteract the direct
increase of the total cost of energy through the permits price (i.e. τt − τt+1 λj1+r > 0, j =
a, b, ∀t ≥ 1). The baseline is characterized by a sequence of permits prices equal to 0.
In a next subsection, we will also briefly consider a ”production-based grand-fathering”
sharing rule in order to highlight how results can depend crucially on the chosen endow-
ment rule.
3.2 Impact on the sectoral growth rates
Given (23), (31), (17) and (32), it follows that :
gijt
gBijt
=
ζjt
ζBjt
=
[
p˜jt
pjt
[
qt
q˜jt
]βj] 11−ϕ
(35)
4The dependance could go further in the past (see Bo¨hringer and Lange (2005)).
5This could be justified if the rule applies at an aggregate level and if the firm is small and receives a
fixed share of the total permits endowment.
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A first observation is that the impact of the EP on the sectoral growth rates is the same
in both regions, i.e. :
gwjt
gBwjt
=
gvjt
gBvjt
, j = a, b (36)
This is because the sectors j of both regions face the same exogenous prices and share
the same technologies.
Given assumptions (33) and (34) and the assumptions about the EP in the previous
subsection, (35) can be rewritten :
gijt
gBijt
=
 1
1 +
τt−τt+1 λj1+r
qt

βj
1−ϕ
(37)
A second observation is that the EP affects negatively the sectoral growth rates, i.e.
gijt < g
B
ijt, because the user cost of energy increases (given that we have assumed that
τt − τt+1 λj1+r > 0, ∀j = a, b; ∀t ≥ 1).
We now compare the impacts of the EP on the capital accumulation of the two sectors
of a given region w.r.t. the baseline. More precisely, we look in what extent the following
inequality is verified :
giat
gBiat
<
gibt
gBibt
, i = v, w (38)
By assumption (33) (βa > βb), and thanks to the fact that it is assumed that the user
cost of energy increases with the EP, it follows from (37) that a sufficient condition for
the inequality (38) to be verified is that λa ≤ λb. The growth rate of the energy intensive
capital sector a is more affected by the EP than the accumulation capital of the other
sector if the endowment effect relative to sector a is not higher than the one relative to
sector b.
3.3 Impact on the sectoral capital stock
We compare the impacts of the EP on the capital accumulation of the two sectors of a
given region w.r.t. the baseline. More precisely, we look in what extent the following
inequality is verified :
kiat
kBiat
<
kibt
kBibt
, i = v, w (39)
Given (23) and (31), one has :
kijt = kij0
t∏
m≥1
gijm and k
B
ijt = kij0
t∏
m≥1
gBijm
so that :
kijt
kBijt
=
t∏
m=1
gijm
gBijm
=
t∏
m=1
 1
1 +
τm−τm+1 λj1+r
qm

βj
1−ϕ
(40)
where the second equality follows from (37). By the previous subsection, we know that
a sufficient condition for the inequality gijm < g
B
ijm (∀j = a, b; ∀t ≥ 1) to be verified is
that λa ≤ λb. Then it follows immediately that the accumulation of capital of the energy
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intensive capital sector a is more affected by the EP than the accumulation capital of the
other sector if the endowment effect relative to sector a is not higher than the one relative
to sector b.
Furthermore, given (36), it follows that the accumulation of capital of a given sector
is affected in the same way in both regions, i.e. :
kwjt
kBwjt
=
kvjt
kBvjt
, j = a, b (41)
3.4 The dynamic production-based grand-fathering rule
To highlight how results depends crucially on the chosen endowment rule, let us consider
briefly the dynamic production-based grand-fathering rule, where a firm’s current permits
endowment depends on its previous period production6. We assume that this dependance
is identical across sectors and regions and that it is internalized by firms when they
maximise their profits. Formally, one applies (4) with e˜ijt = λjt = 0 and :
eijt = µyij,t−1
where 0 < µ < 1 and yij,t−1 is the production characterising the EP until t − 1. eijt is
considered as endogenous by the firms when they solve problem (2). Then given (7) and
(9), p̂jt = pjt + τt+1
µ
1+r
and q˜jt = qt + τt and (40) becomes
kijt
kBijt
=
t∏
m=1
[1 + µ
1 + r
τm+1
pjm
] [
1
1 + τm
qm
]βj 11−ϕ
Recall that given the assumptions about the baseline (cfr. subsection 3.1),
qt =
[
Ca
[
ρt[2−θat]
g
]1−ϕ]1/βa
, pat = 1 and pbt =
q
βb
t
Cb
[
g
ρt[2−θbt]
]1−ϕ
(with Cj =
[
αjepj
]1−βj
β
βj
j
(j = a, b)). Because of assumption (33), the second term between brackets of the RHS is
lower for sector a. But if pbt is increasing (as is observed empirically), then the first term
between brackets of the RHS is lower for sector b, and the overall effect is undecidable
without more information on the parameters. Configurations of parameters are possible
where one obtains the opposite effect as the one obtained with the emission-based grand-
fathering rules analyzed above, i.e. with equality (39) is reversed (for example if the
consumption good price increases sufficiently quickly because of a low exogenous technical
progress ρt).
3.5 Impact on the sectoral added value
In the remaining of the paper we return exclusively to the emission-based grand-fathering
rules because they lead to more clear-cut conclusions. To simplify the analysis, we make
the additional assumption that the endowment effect is identical across sectors and regions
(i.e. λj = λ (j = a, b)). The EP is thus characterized by p̂jt = pjt and q˜jt = q˜t =
qm + τm − τm+1 λ1+r .
We now compare the impacts of the EP on the added value of the two sectors of a
given region w.r.t. the baseline. In our setting, the intermediate consumption is limited
6The dependance could go further in the past (see Bo¨hringer and Lange (2005)).
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to the imported energy consumption. Thus :
vaijt = pjtyijt − qteijt
Given (13) and (14), the previous identity becomes :
vaijt =
[
pjt
p̂jt
− βj qt
q˜jt
]
p˜jkijt
αj
(42)
Along the baseline, p̂jt = pjt and q˜jt = qt, so that
vaBijt = [1− βj]
p˜jk
B
ijt
αj
(43)
The impact of the EP on the added value of sector j of region i at time t is measured
by the following ratio:
vaijt
vaBijt
=
1− βj qteqt
1− βj
kijt
kBijt
(44)
Because the ratio
kijt
kBijt
does not depend on i (recall (41)), this is also true for
vaijt
vaBijt
.
In a similar manner as what was done for the capital stock, we look in what extent
the following inequality is verified:
vaiat
vaBiat
<
vaibt
vaBibt
, i = v, w (45)
As shown by (44), the global impact on vaijt is the product of two fractions. The
second one measures the impact on the regional sectoral capital stock analyzed in the
previous subsection. We know that this impact is stronger for sector a. The first fraction
measures an effect due to the increase of the total cost of energy. Unfortunately, this
energy cost effect affects the added value the other way round (1−βj qteqt > 1−βj). Indeed,
because of the increase of total cost of energy, its share arises in the value of production.
And this effect is stronger the higher βj. Thus the inequality (45) does not follow trivially.
The substitution of (40) and (44) in (45) leads to:
1− βa 1
1+
τt−τt+1 λ1+r
qt
1− βa
t∏
m=1
 1
1 +
τm−τm+1 λ1+r
qm

βa
1−ϕ
<
1− βb 1
1+
τt−τt+1 λ1+r
qt
1− βb
t∏
m=1
 1
1 +
τm−τm+1 λ1+r
qm

βb
1−ϕ
(46)
One has the following proposition:
Proposition 3 Inequality (45) (or (46) is likely to be satisfied if
∏t
m=1
[
1
1+
τm−τm+1 λ1+r
qm
]
is small enough.
Proof. See appendix. ¤
This should happen at least after some time because the sequence{∏t
m=1
[
1
1+
τm−τm+1 λ1+r
qm
]
, t ≥ 1
}
tends to 0. The above proposition is likely to be verified
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in the case of a more and more constraining EP. Then the price of permits τ should indeed
increase. This would induce firms to reduce their demand of fossil energy, thereby pushing
down the price of fossil energy q.
On the contrary, the above proposition is likely to be invalidated if the EP remains
loose and if increasing scarcity pushes the price of energy up. Indeed the sequence{∏t
m=1
[
1
1+
τm−τm+1 λ1+r
qm
]
, t ≥ 1
}
diverges if limm→+∞
τm−τm+1 λ1+r
qm
= 0, which would only
happen if the price of fossil energy increases at a higher rate than the price of permits.
3.6 Impact on the sectoral revenues with transfers
The sectoral revenue with transfers is defined as the sum of the added value of the sector
and of the net endowment of permits:
rijt = vaijt + τt [eijt − eijt] , i = v, w, j = a, b, t ≥ 1 (47)
where eijt is defined by (4).
Let us first consider the non anticipated emission-based grand-fathering sharing rule.
Given (47) and the fact that along the baseline, rBijt = va
B
ijt, it follows that:
rijt
rBijt
=
vaijt
vaBijt
+
τt [ηeij,t−1 − eijt]
vaBijt
We know the first term of the RHS by (44). We now consider the second term: given
(13) and (14), we have eijt =
βj
αj
epjeqt kijt. Then, thanks to (43):
τt [ηeij,t−1 − eijt]
vaBijt
= τt
η
βj
αj
epjeqt−1kij,t−1 − βjαj epjeqt kijt
[1− βj] epjkBijtαj
=
βj
1− βj
τt
q˜t
[
η
q˜t
q˜t−1
kij,t−1
kijt
− 1
]
kijt
kBijt
This result with (44) imply that:
rijt
rBijt
=
1
1− βj
[
1− βj qt
q˜t
+ βj
τt
q˜t
[
η
q˜t
q˜t−1
kij,t−1
kijt
− 1
]]
kijt
kBijt
(48)
=
1
1− βj
[
1− βj
[
1 + η
τt
q˜t−1
kij,t−1
kijt
]]
kijt
kBijt
In this last equality appears sector j’s growth rate characterising the EP scenario.
Making use of (23), (31) and (17) (with p̂jt = pjt), one can write that :
kijt
kij,t−1
=
ζjt
ζBjt
gXijt =[
qteqt
] βj
1−ϕ
gXijt. Then (48) becomes:
rijt
rBijt
=
1
1− βj
1− βj
1 + η τt
q˜t−1
[
q˜t
qt
] βj
1−ϕ 1
gXijt
 kijt
kBijt
We now check under which conditions it is verified that:
riat
rBiat
<
ribt
rBibt
, i = v, w (49)
We have the following result:
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Proposition 4 The inequality (49) necessarily holds after some time.
Proof. We know already that kiat
kBiat
< kibt
kBibt
, i = v, w (see subsection 3.3). A sufficient
condition for (49) to hold is then that:
1
1− βa
[
1− βa
[
1 + η
τt
q˜t−1
[
q˜t
qt
] βa
1−ϕ 1
gXiat
]]
≤ 1
1− βb
1− βb
1 + η τt
q˜t−1
[
q˜t
qt
] βb
1−ϕ 1
gXibt

(50)
If Xiat ≈ Xibt (which is necessarily the case after some time because these two variables
tend to the same limit equal to 1), then the previous inequality holds. Indeed, the two
members can then be written as the values at βa and βb of the function ht(x) =
1−xAt(x)
1−x ,
where At(x) = 1 + η
τteqt−1
[ eqt
qt
] x
1−ϕ 1
g
. Now h′t(x) =
1−At−xA′t[1−x]
1−x < 0, because 0 < x < 1,
At > 1 and A
′
t > 0 (given that q˜t > qt). Then the inequality follows from assumption (33).
¤
Under the anticipated emission-based grand-fathering sharing rule (with λj = λ (j =
a, b)), one obtains:
rijt
rBijt
=
1
1− βj
1− βj
qt + τt
q˜t
+ λ
τt
q˜t−1
[
q˜t
qt
] βj
1−ϕ 1
gXijt
 kijt
kBijt
Then the above proposition follows again by a similar reasoning. It appears that the
fact that firms anticipate the endowment effect or not (as explained in subsection 3.1)
does not modify the previous proposition.
It is interesting to observe that the above proposition will be verified in the context of
a loose EP with an increasing scarcity of fossil energy resources. Then qt increases quicker
than τt, and the two members of inequality (50) tend to 1. Thus
rijt
rBijt
→ kijt
kBijt
. Then (49)
follows from (39).
3.7 Impact on the regional product
The regional product is defined by the sum of the added value of the two sectors of the
region : V Ait = vaiat + vaibt (i = v, w; t ≥ 1). The impact of the EP is measured by the
following ratio:
V Ait
V ABit
=
vaiat
vaBiat
vaBiat
V ABit
+
vaibt
vaBibt
[
1− va
B
iat
V ABit
]
where the share of sector a in region i’s regional product at time t at the baseline
(vaBiat/V A
B
it) writes, given (42):
vaBiat
V ABit
=
1
1 + 1−βb
1−βa
epbepa kBibtkBiat
(51)
This share is thus positively related to the specialization index of region i along the
baseline : χBit = k
B
iat/k
B
ibt.
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In subsection 3.5, we have checked that
vaijt
vaBijt
does not depend on i and that the
inequality vaiat
vaBiat
< vaibt
vaBibt
is likely to be verified. Then, a sufficient condition ensuring that
V Awt
V ABwt
<
V Avt
V ABvt
(52)
is that
vaBwat
V ABwt
≥ vaBvat
V ABvt
, or given (51), that
kBwbt
kBwat
≥ kBvbt
kBvat
, which is equivalent to σt ≥ 1 7. There
should not be any inversion of specialization at date t w.r.t. date 0. Now Proposition
2 states the conditions for a specialization inversion. Thus it is sufficient to inverse
conditions (29) and (30) in order to guaranty that inequality (52) is verified:
(a) kwb0 − kvb0 > 0 : it follows that σt > 1 iff:
[kwb0 + kvb0] [kwa0 − kva0]
[kwa0 + kva0] [kwb0 − kvb0] >
t∏
m=1
θbm
2−θbm
θam
2−θam
From assumption (34) it follows that kwa0 > kva0. The sequence {θat, t ≥ 1} must
be in ”average” high enough w.r.t. the sequence {θbt, t ≥ 1} . This implies that in the
long term, i.e. when the sequences are close to their limit values θj (j = a, b), the above
inequality implies that the ratio θb/θa is low enough.
(b) kwb0 − kvb0 < 0 : it follows that σt > 1 iff:
[kwb0 + kvb0] [kwa0 − kva0]
[kwa0 + kva0] [kwb0 − kvb0] <
t∏
m=1
θbm
2−θbm
θam
2−θam
If kwa0 − kva0 < 0, then the sequence {θat, t ≥ 1} must be in ”average” low enough
w.r.t. the sequence {θbt, t ≥ 1} . This implies that in the long term, i.e. when the se-
quences are close to their limit values θj (j = a, b), the above inequality implies that the
ratio θb/θa is high enough. If kwa0 − kva0 > 0, the regions have opposite specializations
(i.e. kwa0 > kva0 and kwb0 < kvb0), then a remarkable fact is that the above inequality is
necessarily satisfied whatever the spillover parameters.
In summary, the EP affects more the regional product of Region w at date t if this
region is more specialized in the energy intensive sector 1 at date t. Regarding the Belgian
situation, one has kwb0 < kvb0 (where w is Wallonia and v is Flanders), so that case (b)
above applies. Because it is generally expected that the technological spillovers are higher
in the capital good sector (1−θat ≥ 1−θbt =⇒ θat ≤ θbt, t ≥ 1), one has an indication that
there will be no inversion of specialization (at least after some time), so that Wallonia is
likely to be more affected than Flanders by an EP such as studied in this paper.
3.8 Impact on the regional revenues with transfers
The total revenue (i.e. after transfers) of region i (i = v, w) at time t writes:
Rit = riat + ribt, i = v, w
The impact of the EP on the total revenue of region i can be measured by the ratio:
Rit
RBit
=
riat
rBiat
vaBiat
V ABit
+
ribt
rBibt
[
1− va
B
iat
V ABit
]
7Remember that the spread of specialization index is not modified by the environmental policy.
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where we have made use of the fact that along the baseline, rBijt = va
B
ijt (j = a, b) ⇒
RBit = V A
B
it . We want to check if the inequality
Rwt
RBwt
<
Rvt
RBvt
(53)
is satisfied. In the previous subsection, we have checked the conditions ensuring that
the inequality riat
rBiat
< ribt
rBibt
is verified. Then, a sufficient condition ensuring (53) is that
vaBwat
V ABwt
≥ vaBvat
V ABvt
, or given (51), that
kBwbt
kBwat
≥ kBvbt
kBvat
⇔ σt ≥ 1, which is the same condition that
has been studied in the previous subsection.
4 Conclusion
The model presented in this paper has been designed to study the burden sharing of
pollution sharing in the context of a Kyoto-like protocol in a multi-regional multi-sectoral
economy. In order to get the dynamic picture, we have considered time-dependent intra-
sectoral spillovers across regions and learning-by-investing in each sector. In such a con-
text, we have shown progressively how the typical wisdom gathered for the static case
can be altered. In particular, we have disentangled the main price-based and quantity-
based mechanisms which determine the impact of environmental policy at different levels
(sectoral value-added and regional notably).
Within this framework, we have been able to extract some qualitative predictions for
a country like Belgium. Nonetheless, a much more serious quantitative assessment is
needed, and this would require a rigorous calibration of the model, including the exogenous
price processes involved. A major difficulty comes from the fact that some processes like
the price of pollution permits are not very well known given the short historical record.
Alternatively, some reasonable scenarios could be considered. We are currently working
in this line of research.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The system (18-19) can be rewritten in a planar stacked form :
Kjt = ζjtρtAjtKj,t−1 (54)
where
Ajt =
[
1 1− θjt
1− θjt 1
]
and
Kjt =
[
kwjt
kvjt
]
The eigenvalues of Ajt are θjt and 2− θjt. Denote P =
[
1 1
1 −1
]
and
Djm = ζjmρm
[
2− θjm 0
0 θjm
]
. It is easy to check that the vector
[
1
1
]
is an eigenvector
of Ajt associated with the eigenvalue 2 − θjt, ∀t ≥ 1. The same can be said about the
vector
[
1
−1
]
and the eigenvalue θjt. Therefore the eigenvectors are time independent.
It follows that
Kjt = ζjtρtP
[
2− θjt 0
0 θjt
]
P−1Kj,t−1
Then elementary backward successive substitutions leads to the solution to the system
(54) :
Kjt = P
[
t∏
m=1
Djm
]
P−1Kj0 (55)
Then noticing that P−1 = P/2, one obtains (20) and (21).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The comparison (46) amounts to study the x-function : ht(x) =
1−Atx
1−x B
x
1−ϕ
t , where 0 ≤
x < 1, At =
1
1+
τt−τt+1 λ1+r
qt
, Bt =
∏t
m=1
[
1
1+
τm−τm+1 λ1+r
qm
]
and 0 < Bt < At < 1. Notice
that : h′t(x) = e
x
1−ϕ ln(Bt)
[
1−Atx
1−x
ln(Bt)
1−ϕ +
1−At
[1−x]2
]
. Therefore, the sign of h′t(x) is the sign
of the polynomial of degree 2 : Pt(x) = [1− x] [1− Atx] ln(Bt)1−ϕ + 1 − At = At ln(Bt)1−ϕ x2 −
ln(Bt)
1−ϕ [1 + At]x+
[
1− At + ln(Bt)1−ϕ
]
. The discriminant is :
∆ =
[
ln(Bt)
1−ϕ [1 + At]
]2
−4At ln(Bt)
1−ϕ
[
1− At + ln(Bt)1−ϕ
]
=
[
ln(Bt)
1−ϕ [1− At]
]2
−4At[1−At] ln(Bt)
1−ϕ >
0. Thus Pt(x) admits two real roots. These roots are :
x1t =
1 + At − [1− At]
√
1− 4At
1−At
1−ϕ
lnBt
2At
x2t =
1 + At + [1− At]
√
1− 4At
1−At
1−ϕ
lnBt
2At
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with x2t is higher than 1, and is thus of no interest because we limit the analysis of ht(x)
for 0 ≤ x < 1. x1t is at its maximum value (equal to 1) when 1 = 4At1−At
1−ϕ
lnBt
. Thus x1t ≤ 1.
Pt(x) is concave and is thus negative when x ≤ x1t and positive when x1t ≤ x, which
implies that ht(x) is decreasing when x ≤ x1t and increasing when x1t ≤ x. (46) can only
be verified if ht(x) is decreasing at least on some part of the interval [0, 1[ , which supposes
that x1t > 0. A sufficient condition for (46) to be satisfied is then that βb < βa < x1t,
which is more likely to be verified the more x1t is close to 1, that is when Bt is small
enough. In practice, it is not necessary that x1t should be close to 1, because βj (j = a, b)
can be interpreted as the share of fossil energy in production, and should thus be closer
to 0 than to 1.
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